

The Impact of Rail Station Accessibility on Competitiveness of Rail Services: Insights from a Multi-stage Game Theoretic Model

BY

AHMADREZA TALEBIAN, PH.D.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ENGINEERING

ISFAHAN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

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Motivation

- ▶ Conventional Amtrak, HrSR, and HSR, will coexist in the future intercity passenger rail market
- ▶ Different technologies: different operating costs
- ▶ Rail faces major competition from commercial aviation and bus services in intercity travel market
- ▶ Rail can gain its advantage in total travel time by providing convenient access to train stations
- ▶ Rail agency ownership: pure profit maximizer → pure social welfare maximizer

Motivation

- ▶ A three-stage game-theoretic model to answer:
 - ▶ What train technology would be the optimal decision for the rail agency?
 - ▶ How does rail access time affect the competitiveness of rail in the intercity travel market?
 - ▶ To what extent the rail agency's private/public objectives affect rail fare, frequency, and market share?
- ▶ Intercity corridors with one rail agency and one airline (corridors connecting between a city which is an airline's hub and a spoke city)
- ▶ HrSR/HSR infrastructure is available

The model

▶ Three stage gaming model

- ▶ Backward induction is adopted to solve the problem

▶ Equilibrium prices and service frequencies are determined

▶ Rail objective: $O_r = (1 - \theta)\pi_r + \theta CS_r$

↓ Profit
↓ Consumer surplus

$$0 \leq \theta \leq 0.5$$

Profit maximizer: $\theta = 0$

Social welfare maximizer: $\theta = 0.5$

Repeat for available train technologies

Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium

Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium

Train technology determination

Schedule competition

Fare competition



Application


- ▶ Three different technologies, including conventional rail, HrSR, and HSR, for each corridor

| Scenario | Corridor |
|----------|---------------------|
| 1 | Chicago-St. Louis |
| 2 | Chicago-Cleveland |
| 3 | Chicago-Minneapolis |
| 4 | Chicago-Omaha |




Rail station accessibility

- ▶ Impact of rail access/egress time
 - ▶ HSR may become unattractive if the origin and/or destination station is outside a city's downtown
 - ▶ Greater rail market share as station access time decreases
 - ▶ The variation is about 6-9% for 1 hr increase of rail access time




$\theta = 0$




$\theta = 0.5$

Rail station accessibility

- ▶ Impact of rail access/egress time
 - ▶ The extent of change in the rail objective value diminishes with distance
 - ▶ The percentage change in airline profit is less significant when $\theta = 0$



$\theta = 0$




$\theta = 0.5$

Rail station accessibility

- ▶ Elasticity of demand: a measure of the sensitivity of demand function with respect to changes in a certain variable (e.g., price and access time)
- ▶ Example: if price elasticity of rail demand is -1.2, 5% increase in rail fare will reduce demand by 6% ($-1.2 * 5 = -6\%$)

Rail station accessibility

- ▶ Elasticities vary between -0.53 and -0.1
- ▶ Absolute value of elasticity reduces with train speed: as we increase speed we can care less about access time to the rail station
- ▶ Absolute value of elasticity reduces with θ : a private rail agency should care more about the location of the station



Policy insights

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- ▶ Reducing rail station access time considerably impacts rail objective. The impact diminishes with the corridor distance
- ▶ The considerable benefits gained from running a public rail agency could mean reduced, or even negative, profit which necessitates governmental subsidies
- ▶ The operational advantage of HSR over HrSR and conventional rail needs to be weighed against its usually greater costs associated with infrastructure investment

Thank you for your attention!

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Questions?

Talebian, A., and Zou, B. (2018). A multi-stage approach to air-rail competition: Focus on rail agency objective, train technology and station access. *Journal of Rail Transport Planning & Management* 6(1), 48-66.



Ahmadreza Talebian, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Transportation Engineering
Isfahan University of Technology
Email: talebian@iut.ac.ir

Backup slides

Numerical analysis

▶ Market shares



- ▶ The conventional rail → HrSR → HSR conversion leads to greater rail market share
- ▶ When $\theta = 0.5$, the extent of market share increase is generally over 100% from conventional rail to HSR



Numerical analysis

▶ Market shares

- ▶ Maximizing social welfare put more emphasis on attracting passengers, resulting in greater rail market share
- ▶ Rail would become the dominant mode when $\theta = 0.5$





Numerical analysis

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► Frequency response

- When $\theta = 0$, the equilibrium frequencies of rail and air are generally comparable for scenarios 1, 2, and 4, ranging from 6 to 11 per day
- If $\theta = 0.5$, rail frequency will increase. The competition pressure also prompts the airline to adjust frequency





Numerical analysis

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► Fare response

- When $\theta=0$, rail and air fares are very close to each other
- If maximizing social welfare becomes the objective, then rail fare will substantially decrease



Numerical analysis

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► Induced demand

- Increasing the θ value, leads to 92% increase in rail demand
- Overall system demand increase is also significant, by more than 40% between $\theta = 0$ and $\theta = 0.5$

